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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">edpolicy</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Образовательная политика</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Educational Policy</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">2078-838X</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2949-0987</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Российская академия народного хозяйства и государственной службы при Президенте Российской Федерации (РАНХиГС</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">edpolicy-117</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ЦИФРОВОЙ КОВЧЕГ. Смешение</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>DIGITAL ARK. Confusing</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Искусственный интеллект как антропологический проект: от редукции к становлению (ч.1)</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Artificial Intelligence as an nthropological Project: From Reduction to Becoming (Part 1)</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3385-1640</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Николаев</surname><given-names>Д. Е.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Nikolaev</surname><given-names>D. E.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Дмитрий Евгеньевич НИКОЛАЕВ, к. псих. н., заместитель директора</p><p>620219, Екатеринбург, пр. Ленина, 38а</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Dmitry E. Nikolaev, PhD in Psychology., Deputy director</p><p>38a, Lenin Ave., Yekaterinburg, 620219</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">dnpsy2019@gmail.com</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>АНО Исследовательский центр «Аналитик»</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>ANO Research Centre “Analytic”</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2025</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>09</day><month>05</month><year>2026</year></pub-date><volume>23</volume><issue>4</issue><fpage>8</fpage><lpage>18</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Николаев Д.Е., 2026</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2026</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Николаев Д.Е.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Nikolaev D.E.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://edpolicy.ranepa.ru/jour/article/view/117">https://edpolicy.ranepa.ru/jour/article/view/117</self-uri><abstract><p>Современные исследователи активно обсуждают, чем искусственный интеллект (ИИ) является для человека: культурным орудием, средством цифровой экстернализации, цифровым значимым Другим или альтернативой человека. Гораздо реже встречаются размышления о том, кем является сам человек для технологий и их создателей. В работе показано, что технологии ИИ, представляющие собой не единое инженерное решение, а конгломерат различных подходов, не только базируются на принципиально разных образах человека, но и транслируют их через собственную архитектуру, поддерживая развитие соответствующих практик. Тем самым данные решения влияют на культуру, конструируют новые миры и нового человека в них. Архитектура большинства внедряемых и обсуждаемых исследователями типов ИИ (генеративный, человекоцентричный, «заслуживающий доверия», объяснимый, интерпретируемый, воплощенный, ситуативный, энактивистский, социальный, а также проектируемый в рамках социотехнического и акторно-сетевого подходов) опирается на редуцированные образы человека. Одним из ключевых рисков, связанных с широким внедрением подобных систем, является опасность расчеловечивания — «вымывания» из человеческих практик контекстуального понимания, смыслотворчества, моральной и нравственной ответственности, глубоких межличностных связей, содействия, вариативности, автономии и самодетерминации. В результате человек становится не более чем исполнителем социальной роли (пользователь, клиент, работник, пациент, студент и т. п.). Преодоление редукции человека в системах ИИ возможно через изменение дизайна архитектуры. Соответствующие технологии должны выходить за пределы упрощенных антропологий и строиться на сложностных образах, способствуя не только становлению человека и развитию его потенциала, но и формированию по-настоящему человекоцентричной культуры — культуры достоинства (А. Г. Асмолов). В работе сформулированы практические ориентиры, которые могут лечь в основу проектирования подобных архитектур.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>Scholars actively debate what artificial intelligence is for humans — a cultural tool, a means of digital externalization, a digital significant Other, or a future alternative, replacement for the human. Far less frequently discussed is who the human is for technologies and their designers. The paper shows that AI technologies — understood not as a single engineering solution but as a system of heterogeneous approaches — not only rest on fundamentally different conceptions of the human, but also transmit these images through their architectures, thereby facilitating corresponding practices and shaping culture, new worlds and a new forms of being. The architectures of most types of AI both, implemented in practice and only discussed in the literature (generative, human-centered, trustworthy, explainable, interpretable, embodied, situated, enactive, social, as well as designs developed within sociotechnical and actor-network frameworks) rely on reduced, incomplete images of the human being. Among the principal risks associated with broad deployment of such systems is the risk of dehumanization — the elimination from human practices of those features that make them genuinely human: contextual understanding, meaning-making, moral and ethical responsibility, deep interpersonal bonds, coaction, variability, autonomy and self-determination. In these architectures the human too often appears only as a performer of a social role (user, client, worker, patient, student, etc.). Overcoming the reduction of the human in AI architectures is possible through redesign of those architectures. Corresponding technologies must move beyond simplified anthropologies and be built on complex images of the human being. Such technologies can not only facilitate human development and the realization of human potential, but also contribute to the formation of a truly human-centered culture, a culture of dignity (A.G. Asmolov). Practical tenets intended to underlie the design of non-reductionist architectures are formulated.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>искусственный интеллект</kwd><kwd>потенциал человека</kwd><kwd>человекоцентричность</kwd><kwd>образы человека</kwd><kwd>антропология технологий</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>artificial intelligence</kwd><kwd>human potential</kwd><kwd>human-centricity</kwd><kwd>conceptions of the human</kwd><kwd>anthropology of technology</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Асмолов, А. Г. 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